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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a series of Wall Street Journal articles brought to the American
public's attention a problem that had been brewing for decades.' The prob-
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lem was that hospitals were charging uninsured patients rates that were much
higher than rates that the hospitals accepted as full payment from the gov-
ernment and private insurers.2 The price differences cited in many articles
were astonishing. One article described a woman being charged $14,000 for
a hospital stay, when the same hospital would regularly accept $2500 from
private insurance.3 Similar stories were being disclosed across the country
including here in Florida where typical examples included an emergency
room bill of $12,000 when the hospital accepted less than $3000 as full pay-
ment from private insurers.4 Similarly, in another Florida case, a woman was
charged $48,000 for inpatient care when a private insurance company would
only be billed $7000. 5
In response to the public reaction to these stories and success in class
action suits against the tobacco industry, many class action suits were filed
on behalf of the uninsured to try to stop the seemingly outrageous prices the
uninsured were charged for necessary medical services.6 Under pressure
from the public outcry, threat of legislation, and the cost of defending class
action suits, many hospitals claimed to have changed their policies. 7 Never-
theless, the number of uninsured in America continues to grow and was re-
ported as over forty-six million in 2006.8 The problem is especially preva-
lent in Florida, which ranks third worst in terms of the total number of unin-
sured-close to three million-and in terms of the percentage of uninsured. 9
Furthermore, Florida has one of the highest charge-to-cost ratios in the Unit-
ed States, which means that, on average, Florida hospitals' standard charges
to recognize Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong for her valuable suggestions and guidance.
Finally, the author thanks his colleagues on Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedica-
tion in the editing of this article.
1. See Beverly Cohen, The Controversy over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured-No
Villians, No Heroes, 51 VILE. L. REv. 95, 98-99 (2006).
2. Id. at 100-01.
3. George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionabilily and
Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 101 (2005).
4. Bob LaMendola, Uninsured Patients Sue Kendall Hospital for Bills; Group Wants
Same Discount as Insured, SUN SENT., May 12, 2005, at 5B.
5. Frank Gluck, Woman Sues over Hospital Bill; She Says Lakewood Ranch Center
Charged Her $40,000 More Because She is Uninsured, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Aug. 9,
2006, at BM1.
6. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 111-14.
7. See Gerald F. Anderson, From 'Soak the Rich' to 'Soak the Poor': Recent Trends in
Hospital Pricing, 26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 786-87 (2007).
8. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Reg., SB 1756 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s 1756.hr
.pdf [hereinafter SB 1756 Staff Analysis].
9. Id.
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PROTECTING THE UNINSURED
represent a much higher markup over costs than hospitals in other states.' °
Although hospitals claim to have changed their policies, hospitals are still
free to charge whatever they want and some continue to fight lawsuits re-
garding overcharges to the uninsured."
Although there has been some success in terms of settlements to class
action lawsuits, results from cases where the parties did not settle are now
starting to find their way to the appellate courts for determination of what
each state's laws permit. This article will evaluate the way courts can and
should be utilized to help the uninsured obtain reasonable charges for medi-
cal services.
Part II of this article will discuss the most likely causes of action that an
uninsured party may have against a medical service provider that has charged
the uninsured unreasonable rates. Part I1 evaluates issues that such unin-
sured parties may have with trying to achieve class certification. Part IV is a
case analysis of a federal court case where an uninsured party tried to pursue
a class action against a hospital for overcharging her and other similarly si-
tuated uninsured patients. Part V evaluates the Florida legislative response
to the issue of determining reasonable rates for medical services for the unin-
sured and others that utilize the hospitals services without a pre-negotiated
contract rate. Finally, part VI evaluates the best course of action for an unin-
sured person that believes he or she has been overcharged by an emergency
medical service provider.
II. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACTION
Although commentators have suggested numerous causes of action that
uninsured patients who have been overcharged by emergency medical ser-
vice providers could pursue, the two most viable causes of action under Flor-
ida law appear to be breach of the reasonable price term implied into open
priced contracts and violation of Florida consumer protection law. 2 This
section will evaluate what an uninsured person would need to prevail on ei-
ther of these claims.
A. Breach of Open Priced Contract
Under Florida common law, if a contract does not contain any fixed
price or rate, the contract is considered an open priced contract and the law
10. See generally Anderson, supra note 7, at 783.
11. See id. at 786-87.
12. See generally Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar II), 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265
(S.D. Fla. 2006).
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implies a reasonable price to make the contract valid. 13 In Payne v. Humana
Hospital Orange Park,14 the First District Court of Appeal held that under
this rule of law, where the agreement with the medical service provider indi-
cates a patient is to pay the "standard and current rates," a patient is only
bound to pay reasonable charges.15 Even if the patient could have accessed
the service provider's list of charges-commonly referred to as a charge
master-prior to agreeing to the terms of the contract, he or she would not
have been able to truly consent to all of the charges as these charge masters
are generally hundreds of pages long and codified. 16 Thus, unlike situations
where the payor can know the market price based on prior dealings or market
conditions, patients have no real means of determining what charges to ex-
pect prior to accepting the hospital's terms. 7 The inherent nature of emer-
gency room services, where at the time the patient is asked to sign a contract,
neither the hospital staff nor physicians can know which services will be
needed, ensures that Florida courts are likely to continue to consider admis-
sion contracts for emergency room services as open priced contracts under
Florida law.'
8
Many courts around the country, however, have held that prices of hos-
pital admission agreements are definite-therefore, the courts do not need to
imply a fair and reasonable price-where the agreements refer to the hospit-
als' "regular charges," and where the hospitals' price lists are obtainable
through outside sources.' 9 The courts seem to be deferential to the hospitals
since the alternative would be for the hospitals to give every emergency
room patient a contract that was hundreds of pages long listing the prices of
all services even though the patient would never be able to read and under-
13. See Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1239.
15. Id. at 1241 (citing Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Carr, 297 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974)).
16. Id. at 1242 n.3.
17. See id. at 1242.
18. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv. 643, 647 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 191-92
(S.D. 2007) (holding that the patients' own allegations that the price terms were present
showed "the charges [were] ascertainable through reference to outside sources" and there was
"no need to judicially impute a fair and reasonable price term"); Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med.
Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the contracts authorized the
hospital to charge patients the rate it normally charged uninsured patients); Shelton v. Duke
Univ. Health Sys., 633 S.E.2d 113, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that "rates of services
contained in the 'charge master' were necessarily implied in the contract signed by plaintiff').
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stand the entire contents prior to agreeing to treatment. 20 Thus, as one court
concluded, it would be "entirely reasonable and predictable that patients
would agree to pay the hospital's regular rates for whatever services might
be necessary. '21 This logic is especially prevalent in states such as Arizona,
where state law requires the hospital to submit their pricing lists to the state
for approval and publication.22
The question remains whether Florida courts will allow hospitals to dis-
tinguish the language of their form admission contracts from those in
Payne.23 For example, in Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc.,24
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a hospital's form contract had an
indefinite price term because the contract did not have a specific reference to
any extrinsic document from which the patient could have ascertained the
meaning of the word "charges. 2 5 The language of the opinion suggests that
if the contract did indicate a reference to a means of obtaining the standard
charges, then the contract price would be definite and the contract would be
valid.26 In fact, in a recent appeals court decision in Tennessee, the court
made such a distinction indicating that the contract in that case was sufficient
and the price term definite where the contract used the terms "facility's rates
and terms" instead of "charges., 27 The court held that the language of the
contract showed that the hospital had established rates which the patient
20. See DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL 2038498, at *4 (D.N.J. July
19, 2006).
21. Shelton, 663 S.E.2d at 116.
22. Banner Health v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Arizona law requires hospitals to file their customary rates and charges with the Arizona De-
partment of Health for approval. Id. After the Department of Health approves the rates, the
department then publishes the rates. Id. at 1100. After this, a hospital cannot change its rates
without approval from the department. Id. In this case, the signed admission agreements
stated that the patients would "pay the hospital's usual and customary charges, which are
those rates filed annually with the Arizona Department of Health Services." Id. at 1098.
Based on the Arizona statutes and the reference to the published list in the admission agree-
ment, the court held that the contracts did not contain any open price terms and that the court
would not imply a reasonable price term into the contracts. Banner Health, 163 P.3d at 1101.
23. See generally Hall & Schneider, supra note 18.
24. 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001).
25. Id. at 197. Where the contract contained text that the patient was "'financially re-
sponsible to the hospital for charges not covered by this authorization."' Id.
26. See id. The court held that that the contract without a definite price term was invalid.
Id. The court applied a quantum meruit equitable action to come to the same result as in Flor-
ida-the hospital was entitled to a reasonable price for its services. HCA Health Servs., 46
S.W.3d at 197-98.
27. Woodruff v. Fort Sanders Sevier Med. Ctr., No. E2007-00727-COA-R3-CV, 2008
Tenn. App. LEXIS 11, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2008).
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could evaluate for reasonableness.28 The recent passing of the Health Care
Consumer's Right to Information Act will require hospitals to make certain
financial information as well as the costs for some services publicly availa-
ble.29 Thus, Florida courts may be influenced by Arizona precedent and no
longer consider the price of hospital admission contracts to be fixed if the
admission contracts refer to this publicly available information. °
1. Declaratory Relief
Although the claim that a hospital admission contract implies a reason-
able price term can serve as a defense to a collection suit by a hospital or
collection agency, the uninsured patient has the right under Florida law to
preemptively seek declaratory judgment to determine his or her obligation
under the contract rather than defaulting and waiting for the medical provider
to sue.3 ' Section 86.031, Florida Statutes, states that a plaintiff can seek
declaratory judgment on a contract "before or after there has been a breach of
it."'31 Ironically, the plaintiff that has already paid the hospital's full charges
may not have a cause of action for damages if the court finds that the plain-
tiff paid the bill in full because of a mistake of law-that is, the plaintiff did
not know that the contract was an open priced contract and that the plaintiff
was only required to pay a reasonable fee.33 The patient might be able to
recover the overpayment if he or she can show the hospital indicated it would
not provide the necessary services before payment was received. 3 This is
unlikely to be the case, however, because hospitals usually send their bills
after treatment-again because of the difficulty of knowing what treatment
will be needed in advance.
28. Id. at *8.
29. See Health Care Consumer's Right to Information Act, ch. 2008-47, § 1, 2008 Fla.
Laws 739, 739-40.
30. See Banner Health v. Med. Sav. Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
31. See FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (2008).
32. FLA. STAT. § 86.031 (2008).
33. Compare Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1240-41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff does have a cause of action to recover
overpayment on an open priced hospital contract), with Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach,
686 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a mistake of law regarding the
enforceability of an open priced contract for medical services did not warrant "equitable relief
once payment" had been made).
34. See Hall, 686 So. 2d at 657 & n.6.
35. See generally id.
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2. Determining a Reasonable Price for Emergency Medical Services
Once the uninsured plaintiff has convinced the court that the hospital
admission contract contained an indefinite price term, the plaintiff must also
allege facts that could lead a reasonable juror to infer that the charged price
is unreasonable. 36 The common theme in Florida case law is that determin-
ing the reasonableness of a particular hospital charge is a matter for the trier
of fact to determine.37 The Second District Court of Appeal has offered some
guidance for making this determination by indicating "that evidence of...
contractual discounts, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that.., charges
[are] unreasonable., 38 From this, courts have inferred that reasonableness of
charges is based on a multitude of factors of which evidence of contractual
discounts is one. 39 Florida courts have also been reluctant to hold that a rea-
sonable charge could always be determined based on a multiplier of the
Medicare reimbursement rate.'
In Colomar v. Mercy Hospital, Inc. (Colomar J),41 a federal district
court judge interpreting Florida law in a class action case evaluated Florida
36. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sestile, 821 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2002).
37. Id. (holding that where legislation left the term "reasonable" medical expenses unde-
fined, "[tihe fact-finder must construe the word 'reasonable').
38. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the hospital was entitled to the full amount of its charges in a
statutory lien against an uninsured's recovery in a personal injury case where the only evi-
dence offered that the hospital's full charges were unreasonable was that it offered discounts
to managed care providers).
39. See ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265,1269 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
40. See Merkle v. Health Options, Inc., 940 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (indicating that a Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) could not base its statuto-
ry duty to reimburse non-contracted emergency service providers based on simply a percen-
tage above Medicare reimbursement rates). Section 641.513(5), Florida Statutes, dictates
how an HMO must reimburse non-participating emergency service providers who provide
services for the HMO members. FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5) (2008). The statute requires the
HMO to reimburse the provider "the lesser of: (a) The provider's charges; (b) [t]he usual and
customary provider charges for similar services in the community where the services were
provided; or (c) [tihe charge mutually agreed to by the health maintenance organization and
the provider within 60 days of the submittal of the claim." Id. At issue in this case was how
the court should determine the HMO's liability to the non-participating providers. Merkle,
940 So. 2d at 1196. A court decision establishing a means of calculating "[t]he usual and
customary provider charges for similar services in the community where the services were
provided" could offer guidance on how to determine reasonable charges for uninsured pa-
tients. FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5)(b); see Leah Snyder Batchis, Comment, Can Lawsuits Help
the Uninsured Access Affordable Hospital Care? Potential Theories for Uninsured Patient
Plaintiffs, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 493, 525 (2005).
41. 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
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case law as well as case law from other states to establish a multiple factor
approach for determining whether or not hospital charges were reasonable.42
These factors included an analysis of what other hospitals in the surrounding
market charged for similar services (market analysis), a comparison of the
rate that a hospital actually charges and what it accepts as full payment for
those services from other patients (differential pricing), and an analysis of
the hospital's actual costs for providing the service (actual costs). 43 The fac-
tors had to be analyzed together as no single factor was sufficient to establish
that the charges were or were not reasonable. 44
a. Market Analysis
The first factor, market analysis, simply compares the prices that the
hospital actually charged to the uninsured patient with what other hospitals in
the same market would have charged for those services.4 ' At the pleading
stage, the court may be willing to infer that this factor weighs in favor of the
hospital's charges being unreasonable if the hospital's charges are in the top
twenty-five percent of hospitals nationwide. 46 Nevertheless, the court will
probably require that during discovery, the patient produce evidence that the
charges for the specific services provided were higher than those of hospitals
in the same market.47 Considering that hospitals rarely collect their full stan-
dard rates, the prices actually charged by hospitals are probably not truly
market driven. 48 As a result, other area hospitals might also have standard
charges that could be deemed unreasonable with respect to the cost of pro-
viding the services and with respect to what is actually paid in the communi-
ty for those services. 49 Thus, comparing the standard rates might give a false
sense of reasonableness. 50 This is the reason, however, that a market analysis
is only one of several factors in determining reasonableness.5
42. Id. at 1269.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Colomar 1I, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
47. See, e.g., Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar IV), No. 05-22409, 2007 WL
2083562, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007).
48. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 18, at 687 (citing testimony that health economist
Gerard Anderson gave to Congress).
49. See id.
50. ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
51. Id. For example, data based on standard charges reported by California hospitals
being forced to make their charge masters public illustrates standard charges do vary greatly
among hospitals. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open Books,
Showing Huge Price Differences; State Law Requires Disclosing Charges for Goods, Servic-
[Vol. 33
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b. Differential Pricing
The next factor, price differentials, takes into account discounts that the
hospitals will give to other patients that are covered by private insurance or
government programs.52 Florida courts have held that differential pricing by
itself is not sufficient to establish that prices are unreasonable. 3 This im-
plies, however, that differential pricing, although not dispositive, is an im-
portant factor in determining whether or not prices for medical services are
reasonable. 4 Evidence of differential pricing can be used to support the case
that the hospital's costs, as well as the fair market value of the services are
well below the hospital's standard charges.5 5 A hospital is unlikely to con-
tract with private insurers to accept payments that are below its actual cost of
providing those services.56 Although not binding, some courts from other
jurisdictions have held that the reasonable value should be determined based
on what the service provider normally accepts as full payment for the service
and not what the provider charges.5 This is especially true with respect to
hospital billing where, according to one expert witness, some hospitals re-
ceive their "full published charges in only one to three percent of [their] cas-
es."58 Evidence of differential pricing, therefore, can strongly support a pa-
tient's case that the billed charges are unreasonable.59
es; Big Bills for Uninsured; Why a Leech Retails for $81, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al
(showing that in one case a simple blood test which costs $97 at one hospital costs $1733 at
another). Thus, even if overall the standard rates are in line with others in the community,
there is a chance that at least some of the charges will be out of proportion. See id.
52. Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72 (citing Payne v. Humana Hosp., 661 So. 2d
1239, 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam)).
53. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Fernandez, 664 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
54. See id. (holding that the fact that evidence of "contractual discounts, standing alone,
is insufficient to prove that" the hospital's charges were unreasonable, implies that combining
the evidence of these discounts with other evidence could be sufficient).
55. ColomarII, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-72.
56. See id. at 1272.
57. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). "Reasonable value is what someone normally receives for a given
service in the ordinary course of its business from the community that it serves." Id. (citing
Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253, 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
58. Id. at 508. The same expert witness also testified that the same hospital receives
"eighty percent or less" of its published charges in ninety-four percent of its cases. Id.
59. See id.
2008]
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C. Costs
The other major factor that the trier of fact will need to evaluate to de-
termine if a hospital's charges for particular services are reasonable is the
actual cost to the hospital for providing those services.6" This factor is de-
signed to take into consideration a hospital's internal costs for providing par-
ticular services- evidence of higher costs when compared to other hospitals
could explain why that hospital's standard charges are higher.6' Thus, the
higher than market price rates might be reasonable when considering these
internal costs. 62 As with the other factors, actual cost alone is not dispositive;
therefore, a showing of a high markup from the hospital's actual costs will
not by itself prove that the standard rates are unreasonable.63 Thus, a hospital
with lower costs, but similar prices to area hospitals, will not be penalized for
its efficiency.' Nevertheless, this factor might not be highly probative be-
cause there is little correlation between hospitals' standard prices and their
internal CoStS.
65
A hospital's internal costs will be the most difficult factor for the patient
to prove since almost all of the facts regarding costs are within the hospital's
control.' A court might be willing to look at overall hospital statistics-i.e.,
the hospital's overall ratio of its charges to costs-for the purpose of stating
a claim. 67 After discovery, however, the patient will have to prove that the
charges for the particular services in question greatly exceeded the hospital's
costs for those services. 68 An additional problem with analyzing costs is that
a hospital might be able to show that the cost of treating an uninsured patient
is not the same as treating one that is either insured or covered by a govern-
ment program where the hospital has more assurance that a portion of the bill
60. Colomar H, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 782-83.
66. See Colomar I1, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Colomar IV, No. 05-22409, 2007 WL 2083562, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 20,
2007) (explaining that where the court, in determining whether or not there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to infer that the hospital's charges were unreasonable, indi-
cated that it expected the plaintiff/patient to have provided evidence of the hospital's actual
cost for providing the specific services to that patient and that such an inference could not be
made based solely on the hospital's overall ratio of its charges to costs for a general category
of care).
[Vol. 33
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will be paid. 69 Furthermore, the hospital could argue that the contracts with
some private insurance companies generate volume and that this additional
revenue would have to be reduced from the costs of providing service to pa-
tients covered by such contracts.7°
Even if the patient is able to produce sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that the billed charges are unreasonable, the trier
of fact will still have to make a determination of what a reasonable charge
should be.71 Some courts and commentators have suggested that a reasona-
ble rate should be based on the hospital's own collection data and should be
the average amount that the hospital has actually received and accepted from
government payers, contracted private insurers, and non-contracted private
insurers. 72 Because the rates paid by government agencies are fixed by sta-
tute and are not the result of any bargaining with the hospital, some have
suggested that the reasonable price an uninsured should be required to pay
should be based only on what the hospital collects from private insurers.73
Rather than setting the reasonable rate as the average of what a provider has
accepted from private insurers, the reasonable rate could be set at either the
maximum or seventy-fifth percentile.74 This would put the hospital in better
position than with most private insurers.75 In Florida, the court might also
look to what the provider of emergency service has accepted as usual and
customary charges from HMOs with which the hospital has no contract for
services provided to those HMOs' members.76 This situation is analogous to
69. Galvan v. Nw. Mem. Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 529, 538-39 (Il. App. Ct. 2008) (holding
that it was not an unfair trade practice to charge uninsured patients twice what insured patients
were charged because the patients were not similarly situated.)
Underlying the plaintiffs claim that charging uninsured patients a higher price
amounts to oppressive pricing is a suggestion that the insured and uninsured pa-
tients are similarly situated. They are not. The plaintiff ignores the obvious differ-
ence between an insured patient and one uninsured. An insured patient by defini-
tion has medical insurance .... In return for the insurance premiums, his insurance
company contracts with a hospital for medical services at a reduced rate. The con-
tract benefits the hospital because payment is guaranteed. There is no such guaran-
tee from uninsured patients.
Id.
70. See id. at 539.
71. See, e.g., Colomar IV, 2007 WL2083562, at *6.
72. See Nation, supra note 3, at 135-36 (suggesting that "[a]n uninsured patient should
[only] be required to pay the average amount [that] the hospital actually [collected] and ac-
cept[ed]" from governmental agencies and private insurers).
73. Id. at 104.
74. See Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., (Maldonado 11) 493 F.3d 521, 526 n. 10
(5th Cir. 2007).
75. See id.
76. See generally Batchis, supra note 40, at 525.
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the uninsured patient since there is no benefit provided by the HMO of refer-
rals as is the case with contracted private insurers.77
B. Violation of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Practice Act
An uninsured patient that has been charged an unreasonable amount for
emergency room services might also have a statutory cause of action based
on the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act (FDUTPA).8 One
of the primary purposes of this act is "[t]o protect the consuming public and
legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of
competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce. '79 The act specifically prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."8 The act
also provides for individual remedies that include a declaratory judgment
that a particular act or practice violates FDUTPA and injunctive relief to stop
such violations or prevent them in the future.8 While the Florida Legislature
never defined "deceptive" or "unfair," the Supreme Court of Florida in PNR,
Inc. v. Beacon Property Management, Inc.82 has affirmed the definition of an
unfair practice or act as "one that 'offends established public policy' and one
that is 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially inju-
rious to consumers."' 83 The Court has approved the definition of a deceptive
act to be one where there is a "'representation, omission, or practice that is
77. See id.
78. See FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2008).
79. Id. § 501.202(2).
80. Id. § 501.204(1).
81. Id. § 501.211(1).
82. 842 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2003).
83. Id. at 777 (quoting Samuels v. King Motor Co., 782 So. 2d 489, 499 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001)). Section 501.203(3)(b), Florida Statutes, states that in determining violations
of the Act, courts should use "[t]he standards of unfairness and deception set forth and inter-
preted by the Federal Trade Commission [(FTC)] or the federal courts." FLA. STAT. §
501.203(3)(b). Thus, although this definition of unfair and deceptive acts is currently used by
many Florida courts, the definition could be challenged because it differs from the FTC's
definition of unfair acts or practices. See David J. Federbush, The Unexplored Territory of
Unfairness in Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, 73 FLA. B.J. 26, 30 (May
1999). The current FTC definition of an unfair act or practice is an act or practice which
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2008). Public policy considerations can now serve as evi-
dence of an unfair practice but cannot be the primary basis for considering an act or practice to
be unfair. Id.
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likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment." '84
Although there are no appellate decisions affirming that emergency ser-
vice providers may be violating FDUTPA by charging unreasonable
amounts, there is sufficient case law to suggest that such billing practices, if
proven, would violate the act.85 First, in PNR, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that even a single breach of contract can result in a claim under
FDUTPA if the action which led to the breach of contract would also be
deemed "an unfair or deceptive act" or practice under prevailing case law.86
Furthermore, although some states exclude members of the medical profes-
sion from their deceptive and unfair trade practices acts,87 Florida law does
not have any such exclusion.88 Finally, there are no state or federal laws that
might grant an exemption from FDUTPA to hospitals and authorize them to
charge unreasonable rates to uninsured patients. 89
One main reason that pursuing a FDUTPA claim is so important for the
uninsured patient is that the statute permits the court to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.90 The recovery of attorney's fees can be especially
important in claims of unreasonable charges for emergency services for two
reasons. First, the uninsured party is unlikely to have the financial resources
to hire a lawyer regardless of whether the party is the plaintiff seeking decla-
84. PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777 (quoting Millennium Commc'ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Office of the Att'y Gen., 761 So. 2d 1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
85. See generally, Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar 1), No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *21-22 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2006).
86. PNR, Inc., 842 So. 2d at 777 & n.2.
87. See, e.g., Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., 633 S.E.2d 113, 117 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Gaunt v. Pittaway, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)) (stating that
North Carolina's unfair and deceptive trade practices statute specifically excluded "acts com-
mitted by medical professionals"); DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 05-1665, 2006 WL
2038498, at *8 (D.N.J. July 19, 2006) (stating that medical "professionals are not covered by
the Consumer Fraud Act").
88. See Michael Flynn, Consumer Protection Law: Physician Deceptive and Unfair
Business Practices, 71 FLA. B.J. 49, 50 (July 1997).
89. See Colomar 1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834 at *17. Section 501.212(1), Florida
Statutes, states that "[a act or practice required or specifically permitted by federal or state
law" is exempt from FDUTPA. FLA. STAT. § 501.212(1) (2008). Nevertheless, the court in
Colomar I did not find that statutes which permitted the defendants to offer discounts to pri-
vate insurers, nor statutes that required them to produce an itemized bill on request specifical-
ly authorized the defendants to charge unreasonable rates to uninsured patients. Colomar I,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834 at *17.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1) (2008) ("In any civil litigation resulting from an act or
practice involving a violation of this part .... the prevailing party, after judgment in the trial
court and exhaustion of all appeals, if any, may receive his or her reasonable attorney's fees
and costs from the nonprevailing party.").
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ratory judgment or a defendant in a collection suit.9 Second, without the
recovery of attorney's fees, many claims against emergency service provid-
ers would be "negative-value suits" where the cost of attorney's fees exceeds
the total expected recovery from the claim.92
Those pursuing causes of action, under FDUTPA, however, have to be
careful because the explicit language of the statute allows the court to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.9 3 The statute's award of attorney's
fees was even riskier prior to a 1994 amendment when the "award of reason-
able attorney's fees to the prevailing party" was mandatory and not left to the
discretion of the court.94 A recent decision by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal rejected the notion that the trial court judge could only award attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing defendant in a FDUTPA claim if the plaintiffs
claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."95  The court
indicated that the statute clearly left the award of attorney's fees to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.96 The trial judge's decision to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing defendant might have been influenced by the fact that both
parties were charity organizations.97 Unfortunately, another recent decision
to award attorney's fees, which was also upheld by the same district court,
suggests that trial judges are likely to award attorney's fees in contract dis-
91. See Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar II1), 242 F.R.D. 671, 682 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (indicating that class action is not superior because plaintiffs could recover attorney's
fees under FDUTPA). An uninsured patient is most likely going to be from a household "with
less than $25,000" where at least one person does work full time. James McGrath, Over-
charging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated Medical
Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 173, 193 (2007).
92. See J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1735, 1737 (2006) (addressing how
class action waiver agreements can be unconscionable because they essentially remove one's
right to recovery in cases where the cost of pursuing a claim will exceed the expected recov-
ery for that claim).
93. FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1).
94. See David J. Federbush, Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees Under FDUTPA, 78 FLA. B.J.
26, 26 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Federbush, Attorneys' Fees].
95. Humane Soc'y of Broward County, Inc. v. Fla. Humane Soc'y, 951 So. 2d 966, 968
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). Prior to this ruling, Mr. Federbush had theorized that the trial
courts would likely only award attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's
claims were frivolous because the courts would follow the Supreme Court of Florida's
precedent for other public policy cases such as discrimination cases. Federbush, Attorneys'
Fees, supra note 94, at 29. The plaintiff in Humane Society tried to apply Mr. Federbush's
exact arguments as to why attorney's fees should not be granted, but the court disagreed.
Humane Soc'y, 951 So. 2d at 968.
96. Id.
97. See id. (acknowledging in a motion for fees and costs that "both groups are doing
good work and ultimately donations are going to be used to pay attorney's fees, whichever
way it goes").
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putes where the court believes the party adding the FDUTPA claim has only
increased the risk for both parties by adding the extra claim.98 In theory, this
means that if the uninsured patient were to lose, not only would he or she be
liable for the full hospital bill and his or her attorney's fees, but he or she
could also be liable for the hospital's legal fees as well. 99
III. ISSUES WITH CLASS CERTIFICATION
A key for uninsured patients to succeed in using litigation as a means of
redressing their overcharges by emergency service providers is class certifi-
cation."°° Class certification is important because the uninsured face two
major obstacles in pursuing litigation.' °' First, uninsured people are likely to
lack the financial resources to contest the hospital's charges in court. 0 2
Second, even if the uninsured people do have the financial resources, the cost
of litigation might far exceed any gain they hope to achieve-either a reduc-
tion in their debt obligation to the hospital or a return of overcharges they
have already paid.'0 3 If, however, the uninsured can certify themselves as a
class against a particular provider, then they have a much better chance of
success as the cost of the legal fees will be distributed amongst the class and
the risk for the provider will be greatly increased.'04 In fact, in many cases,
once courts granted class certification, hospitals sought prompt settlement. 10
5
Although there was some initial success with class certification, °6 the current
trend in both Florida and federal courts seems to be that class certification for
the uninsured, with respect to the rates they have been charged for emergen-
cy services, is not appropriate."
If the uninsured do certify a class, either the uninsured themselves or
the defending service providers could remove the case to a federal court un-
98. See Mandel v. Decorator's Mart, Inc., 965 So. 2d 311, 313 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that it was "not uncommon for litigants to inject claims of... deceptive...
practices into a contractual dispute" and that the tactic was rarely successful).
99. See id.
100. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 787 (indicating that hospitals were usually quick to
settle once class certification was granted).
101. See McGrath, supra note 91, at 193.
102. See id. (explaining that an uninsured person is more likely to have an income of less
than $25,000, with at least one family member working full time).
103. See Glover, supra note 92, at 1737 (discussing how class action waivers can prevent
potential plaintiffs from ever bringing suits).
104. See generally id.
105. Anderson, supra note 7, at 787.
106. Cohen, supra note 1, 143-45.
107. See, e.g., Maldonado H, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
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der the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.08 According to this Act, the fed-
eral courts will have original subject matter jurisdiction if the amount in con-
troversy exceeds five million dollars, the class action has over one hundred
members, and there is minimal diversity. " Minimal diversity is established
when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant."'' 0 Although the federal court must decline jurisdiction
if two-thirds of the class and the primary defendants are both citizens of Flor-
ida, many class actions, especially against for-profit hospitals, will satisfy
these requirements."'
A. Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy Factors
Whether the case is tried in federal or state court will have little bearing
on whether the class can be certified because the Florida and Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requirements for class certification are almost identical."'
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representa-
tive parties on behalf of all members only if: 1) the class is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable [(numerosi-
ty)]; 2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
[(commonality)]; 3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [(typicali-
ty)]; and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class [(adequacy)]."13
These requirements are generally referred to as the "numerosity, commonali-
ty, typicality, and adequacy factors."'"
4
To satisfy the numerosity requirement, the party seeking to certify the
class must be able to prove with reasonable certainty that the class size will
be so large that joinder of individual members would be impracticable." 5
While it might be easy for an uninsured person trying to certify a class to
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
109. Id. § 1332(d)(2).
110. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
111. See id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).
112. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 23, with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
114. Colomar 11, 242 F.R.D. 671, 674 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Satisfying the adequacy
factor for purposes of establishing a class action is not a problem that is unique to patients
contesting the reasonableness of charges for emergency medical services and is beyond the
scope of this article. See id. at 677-80.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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determine how many uninsured patients received treatment from the same
hospital, this information alone is not sufficient. 1 6 The patient will probably
also have to show that a certain percentage of those patients, like themselves,
are still obligated to pay an unreasonable sum or have already paid an unrea-
sonable amount."7 Since many of the uninsured that were treated at hospit-
als may have already been offered discounts or had their bills subsequently
paid by a government program such as Medicaid, the absolute number of
uninsured patients that were treated would be insufficient." 8 This problem
can be overcome; however, it might require significant expenditure just to
reasonably identify the class prior to filing suit." 9
To satisfy the requirement of commonality, the party seeking class cer-
tification only needs to show that there is at least one "common question of
law or fact" as long as that single common question "affects all class mem-
bers" the same way. 120 The courts in the Eleventh Circuit and in Florida do
not require much to prove commonality.' 2' Nevertheless, uninsured people
trying to show that the hospital charged them an unreasonable amount may
have a difficult time showing commonality, unless they can establish that the
hospital intentionally raised prices for uninsured patients. Without evi-
dence of a common pricing scheme, and considering that some hospitals'
charge master lists comprise of tens of thousands of items, the only common
question would be whether or not the hospital was obligated to charge a rea-
sonable amount.Y13 The defendant hospital could concede that the pricing
term is open and at the same time argue that the prices on its charge master
list are reasonable.2 4 Thus, proving commonality could be difficult if the
hospital wants to avoid class status. 12
5
Even if the uninsured parties could establish commonality, typicality is
even more difficult to prove. 26 In order to satisfy the typicality requirement,
the representative plaintiff must be able to prove the claims of other class
members in proving his or her own claim.'27 Thus, typicality is usually es-
116. See Colomar II1, 242 F.R.D. at 675-76.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 676.
119. See generally id.
120. Id.
121. See Colomar II1, 242 F.R.D. at 676 ("The threshold for commonality is not high.")
(quoting Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D. 484, 490 (S.D. Fla. 2003)).
122. See id. at 680.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 680.
125. Id. at 676-77.
126. See Colomar II1, 242 F.R.D. at 677.
127. Id.
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tablished when the elements required to prove the representative's claims are
the same elements required to prove the claims of the entire class. 28 Courts
across the country seem unwilling to find that, in general, all of a hospital's
charges are unreasonable or even to define a reasonable charge as a percen-
tage of some government established rate-such as Medicare reimbursement
rates. 29 Thus, courts will require that the uninsured prove that each charge
itself is unreasonable.130 Regardless of how this is measured, a representative
member that proves his or her charges were unreasonable, would only estab-
lish that other patients charged the same amount for the same services during
the same time period were also charged unreasonable amounts.' 3' A party
seeking to certify a class could try to convince the court that a reasonable
rate should be calculated based on the range of fees the hospital actually ac-
cepts for those charges.'32 If the court agrees to this definition of reasonable-
ness, the plaintiff might be able to establish typicality as the same source of
hospital records could be used to prove the claims of other class members. 3
B. Predominance and Superiority
Even if the court were to accept that the representative member could
establish typicality, in order to certify a class for monetary damages, the rep-
resentative would still have to show that "the questions of law or fact com-
mon to class members predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members" (predominance). ' 34 To establish predominance, the issues
that are common to proving the claims of the class as a whole must predomi-
nate over issues that only need to be proven for individual claims. 35 If after
all of the issues which are common to the entire class have been adjudicated,
class members must still introduce a great deal of proof specific to individual
claims, then the claim does not satisfy the predominance requirement.
36
Whereas in Florida, courts cannot establish unreasonableness based solely on
price differentials and discounts offered to insured patients, the courts are
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Maldonado I, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
130. See id. at 525-26.
131. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 677.
132. See Maldonado 11, 493 F.3d at 526 n. 10 (rejecting the proposal that a reasonable rate
could be established as a weighted average of amounts the hospitals receive from insurers and
government programs saying that "[ujnder this approach, contrary to common sense, approx-
imately half of the insurers would have negotiated an 'unreasonable' rate").
133. See id.
134. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
135. Colomarlll, 242 F.R.D. at 680.
136. Id.
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unlikely to find that predominance is satisfied.'37 Each member of the class
will have to prove that his or her individual charges are unreasonable. 38
In addition to proving predominance, the party seeking class certifica-
tion for money damages must also show "that a class action is superior to
other available methods" for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy.'39 The main factor that works against class action being a superior
method to resolve the claims of hospital overcharging uninsured patients is
the difficulty the court might encounter trying to manage all of the claims.' 4°
Since each class member will have been billed for different services and at
different times, each additional member will add to the amount of evidence
the court needs to manage.14 ' Those uninsured people who seek to certify the
class are likely to claim that without class certification they lack the financial
resources to seek a remedy for their injury.142 However, federal courts have
determined that where there is a statutory basis for recovering attorney's
fees, class action is not superior to other methods of adjudication.1 43 Thus, if
plaintiffs include the FDUTPA claim in their complaint, they may actually
hurt their chances of class certification based on superiority alone.'"
C. Injunctive Relief
If the plaintiffs seeking to certify the class seek injunctive relief, then in
addition to the first four requirements, they must show that the medical ser-
vice provider has acted on "grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate res-
pecting the class as a whole."' 4 5 This type of injunctive class relief is gener-
ally applicable when a defendant has charged all of its customers an undiffe-
rentiated fee. 46 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to certify a class for injunctive relief
would need to show that the service providers had some generally applicable
system such as "'systematically raising prices for uninsured patients by a set
percentage.""1 47 Furthermore, based on the Florida definition of reasonable
137. See Maldonado II, 493 F.3d at 525-26.
138. See id.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
140. Colomar 11I, 242 F.R.D. at 682.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 680.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
146. See Colomar 111, 242 F.R.D. at 683.
147. Id. (quoting Maldonado v. Ochsner (Maldonado 1), 237 F.R.D. 145, 151 (E.D. La.
2006)).
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charges, a court could not impose injunctive or class-wide relief across the
whole class because an order requiring a service provider to stop "overcharg-
ing" uninsured patients would lack the specificity required for injunctive
relief.148 In fact, many courts see the request for injunctive relief in these
types of cases as a violation of the separation of powers by asking the court
to legislate.
149
D. Florida's Specific Class Certification Issues
Plaintiffs filing their claims in Florida state courts rather than federal
courts must comply with the same class certification requirements. 5 ° More-
over, the Florida courts require evidentiary support before granting class
certification if the nonmoving party objects to the certification.'' Thus, the
court cannot simply rely on the pleadings when one party objects to certifica-
tion and must actually have an evidentiary hearing to determine if certifica-
tion is appropriate.1 52 Florida law allows for an interlocutory appeal of class
certification. 153 The court may find that the "trial court abused its discretion"
if the class determination was made without the evidentiary hearing.'54 This
provides an obstacle to class certification in state courts because the plaintiffs
148. Id.
149. See Howard v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 924 So. 2d 1245, 1259 (La. Ct. App.
2006) (concluding that plaintiffs' request for the court to "establish what constitutes reasona-
ble prices" for medical services was '"a novel and untested theory' ... [and] not appropriate
for class certification"); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 565-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Plaintiffs here have lost their way; they need to consult a map or a compass
or a Constitution because Plaintiffs have come to the judicial branch for relief that may only
be granted by the legislative branch.").
If the Court were to issue an injunction against [the hospital] to prevent it from
charging "unreasonable" prices, the court would also have to determine what prices
were "reasonable" for not only [plaintiffs] procedure, but every other hospital pro-
cedure. This goes against constitutional Article 111 considerations of justiciability
and separation of powers .... Medical regulation issues have typically been re-
solved by the legislative process. ... It is not within the scope of judicial powers to
decide medical billing procedures and pricing, and the Court may not issue an advi-
sory opinion in this regard.
Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l Hosp., No. 8:06-cv-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48867, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2007).
150. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
151. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Elsenheimer, 952 So. 2d 575, 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., id. at 582 (where Second District Court of Appeal reverses a trial court's
grant of class certification even though there had been no final adjudication in the case).
154. Id.
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seeking class certification will need to show that a sufficient number of the
class was overcharged for medical services.155
IV. CASE STUDY: COLOMAR V. MERCY HOSPiTAL, INC.
Barbara Colomar, who at the time did not have medical insurance and
did not qualify for any governmental assistance, went to Mercy Hospital in
Miami, Florida, because she was having trouble breathing after exposure to
pesticides in her house.'56 Prior to receiving any treatment at the hospital,
Colomar signed an "Authorization and Guarantee" form in which she agreed
to "pay any and all unpaid bills ... which are not covered by insurance or
otherwise paid.' 57 The authorization form did not indicate what treatment
she would receive or how much she would be charged. 158 Colomar's treat-
ment at the hospital for her respiratory problems lasted approximately twen-
ty-six hours.'59 Colomar later received a bill from the hospital for $12,863.'6
She paid $1750 of this bill and the hospital sent the remaining balance to
collections.'
6
'
After Mercy Hospital allegedly threatened to damage Colomar's credit
if she did not pay the bill in full, Colomar filed suit on behalf of herself and
other uninsured patients who had received treatment at Mercy Hospital.
162
Colomar did not allege any problems with the care that she received at Mer-
cy, but rather alleged that Mercy Hospital had breached its contract with her
by charging her an unreasonable amount and that Mercy had violated
FDUTPA with its unfair billing practices. 163 The case was removed to feder-
155. See id. Florida has allowed class certification for physicians that are contesting the
reimbursement they have received from HMOs with which they had no contract for emergen-
cy services they provided to the HMOs' members. See Merkle v. Health Options, Inc., 940
So. 2d 1190, 1200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Those claims are based on a Florida statute
that requires the HMOs to reimburse them at the reasonable and customary rate. Id. at 1196.
The court will face the same challenges in determining the usual and customary rates in those
cases as it will when determining reasonable rates for the uninsured and managing the physi-
cians as a single class. See id.
156. Colomar I, No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2,
2006).
157. Id. at *6.
158. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. 671, 674 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
159. Colomar I, No. 05-22409, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *5.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *5.
162. Id. at *2-3, 5; Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 673.
163. Colomar 1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95834, at *6. In her first amended complaint,
Colomar had also alleged that the hospital had been unjustly enriched and had violated its duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at n.3. The court dismissed these two charges along with a
claim alleging that Mercy violated FUDPTA via deceptive practices that would lead the ordi-
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al court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which gave the federal
court original jurisdiction over certain class action cases with at least minim-
al diversity.'r
A. The Good: Cause of Action Exists
In denying Mercy's motion to dismiss Colomar's second amended
complaint, the court acknowledged that a cause of action does exist in Flori-
da for uninsured patients that claim to have been charged unreasonable
amounts by hospitals. 165 In her second amended complaint, Colomar alleged
that although she was charged $12,863, the hospital's internal costs for the
services she received were only $2,098.166 She also alleged that Mercy, on
average, charges uninsured patients four times the Medicare reimbursement
rates.'67 Furthermore, she alleged that hospitals owned by Mercy's parent
corporation ranked "among the top 13% of all hospitals nationwide in
charges" and "in the top 10% of hospitals nationwide in terms of cost-to-
charge ratio"-charging uninsured patients, on average, four times the actual
costs.
68
The court agreed that because the contracts with uninsured patients had
open pricing terms, Mercy was obligated to charge Colomar and other unin-
sured patients that signed similar agreements reasonable amounts.' 69 The
court held that under Florida law, the court had to analyze several nonexclu-
sive factors to determine if the charges were reasonable. 70 First, the court
examined the overall market for hospital services to determine if Mercy's
charges were within the range of what other hospitals in the community
would charge for similar services. 7 ' Because the court was only analyzing
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court was willing to infer from the al-
leged facts that Mercy's charges were more than what most hospitals charged
for the same services. 172 The court noted that if Mercy's charges were not in
the top twenty-fifth percentile, then the court would most likely have inferred
nary uninsured patient to believe he or she would be charged at a discounted rate. Id. at *16,
*22.
164. Id. at *4.
165. See Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
166. Id. at 1268.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Colomar II, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1269.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1270.
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that the charges were similar to other similarly situated hospitals.'73 Even if
this were the case, however, the court could still hold that the charges were
unreasonable based on other factors. 74
The second factor the court looked at was the price the hospital charged
other patients for the same services.'75 The fact that the hospital will accept
much lower payments from other patients implies that the actual value of the
services may be less than what the hospital charges. 176 In this case, Colomar
had alleged that the hospital offered significant discounts to insured patients
and those covered by government benefits. 77 The court held that proving
this differential pricing along with other factors could support the allegation
that the charges were unreasonable. 178
Finally, the court analyzed the hospital's actual costs to determine if the
price was reasonable. 79 Colomar alleged in her complaint that the hospital
had charged her more than six times the cost of treating her. 80 Accepting the
allegations as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the court held
that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the charges were reasona-
ble.' 8' The court then held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to sup-
port a claim that Mercy's charges for the services it provided to Colomar
were unreasonable. 8 2 The court also held that the same facts were sufficient
to support a claim that the hospital's billing methods constituted an unfair
practice in violation of FUDPTA 83 Furthermore, even though Colomar may
not have suffered any monetary damages since she had not yet paid an unrea-
sonable amount, the court held she was entitled to declaratory judgment to
determine the amount she lawfully owed." 4
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1271.
175. Colomar 11, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1271.
176. Id. at 1272.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Colomar I, 461 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1274.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1273 (determining she had not yet suffered monetary damages because she had
not yet paid what she alleged in her complaint the services actually cost the hospital to pro-
vide).
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B. The Bad: Case Not Suitable for Class Certification
After her initial success, however, Colomar suffered a major setback
when the court denied her motion for class certification. 185 The court first
held that Colomar failed to prove that the class size was "'so numerous that
joinder of all members [was] impracticable."",186 Although Colomar was able
to identify "over 24,000 uninsured patients" that Mercy treated during the
class period, Colomar was unable to show which of those patients had either
paid the full bill or at least were never offered discounts or write-offs. 8 7 The
court was unwilling to infer that a minimal number of these uninsured pa-
tients had either paid or were still liable for an unreasonable portion of their
bills without further evidence from Colomar. 188 The court implied that Co-
lomar would establish the requirement of numerosity if she could specifically
identify forty such members.1
89
Nevertheless, even if Colomar could prove that the class size was suffi-
cient, the court would most likely still have denied class status because of the
fact specific nature of proving that Mercy's charges were unreasonable.1 90
That is, each bill from each class member would have to be evaluated sepa-
rately and compared with market conditions, internal costs, and other con-
tractual prices to determine if each charge were unreasonable. 9' Proving
that Mercy's charges to Colomar were unreasonable would not prove that
charges to any other class member were unreasonable. 92 Colomar requested
that the court analyze Mercy's average charges to all class members to de-
termine the reasonableness of the charges.193 The court refused this proposal
indicating that averages would not prove that a particular charge was unrea-
sonable. 194 Thus, the court held that Colomar's claim failed to satisfy the
requirements of commonality and typicality."9  Although Colomar might
have been able to show some question of law in common under commonali-
ty, it was unlikely that she could show that proving her claim would neces-
185. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc. (Colomar II1), 242 F.R.D. 671, 673 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
186. Id. at 675 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at676.
189. See id. at 675-76.
190. Colomar 11, 242 F.R.D. at 677 n.7 (indicating that although plaintiff might be able to
plead sufficient facts to satisfy numerosity and commonality, this effort would prove futile
because of inherent problems with proving the other factors).
191. See id. at 677.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 678.
194. Id.
195. Colomar III, 242 F.R.D. at 677-78.
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sarily prove any other class member's claim. 96 The court also held that the
difficulty in obtaining reasonableness of each particular charge to every pa-
tient prevented the case from meeting the requirements of class certification
for money damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or in-
junctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 197 The main
problem was that Colomar did not allege any facts showing that the hospital
was raising its prices by a set percentage to uninsured patients."' The com-
plaint was that the undiscounted prices the hospital charged were unreasona-
ble.' 99 Because each charge would have to be evaluated separately, the case
would become extremely difficult to manage as a class, and therefore class
action was not "superior to other available methods" for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.2° Colomar had argued that without class
action status, plaintiffs would be deterred from bringing suit due to a lack of
financial resources to hire a lawyer.21  The court's response was that the
statutory claim under FDUTPA allowed recovery of legal fees so that class
status was not superior in this case.20 2
C. The Ugly: Insufficient Evidence to Prove Price Was Unreasonable
Although failing to have her class certified was a major setback, Colo-
mar's next setback was even greater when the court granted summary judg-
ment to Mercy Hospital because Colomar had failed to produce enough evi-
dence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Mercy's charges
were unreasonable.2 °3 The court emphasized that its holding did not indicate
that the hospital's charges were reasonable, but that Colomar had not pro-
duced sufficient evidence to carry her burden.2 °4
196. Id. at 677.
197. Id. at 681-83.
198. Id. at 683.
199. Id.
200. Colomar Il, 242 F.R.D. at 681-82.
201. Id. at 682.
202. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 501.2105 (2008)).
203. Colomar IV, No. 05-22409, 2007 WL 2083562, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007).
204. Id. Colomar's failure to produce sufficient evidence might have been particular to
her case rather than indicative of challenges that face other uninsured patients that believe
they were charged unreasonable amounts. Id. For example, the undisputed facts showed that
she was only charged 155% of the Medicare reimbursement rate rather than the 436% that she
alleged Mercy on average charges uninsured patients. Id. at *5 & n.4. Colomar's own expert
witness had testified that charges in the range of 150% of Medicare would be reasonable. Id.
at *5. Furthermore, she did not introduce any evidence to show what Mercy's actual cost to
treat her was even though she originally alleged that Mercy's cost was just over two thousand
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V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A common theme among the courts across the country seems to be that
resolving medical billing issues is a legislative function.205 While the courts
are equipped to analyze individual cases to determine if prices are reasonable
for a particular service on a particular date, the courts are not empowered to
make more far reaching resolutions.0 6 This section will focus on the actions
that the Florida Legislature has taken to address issues with the open-ended
nature of medical service pricing in the absence of contractual agreements.
There are five major situations where patients are treated in the absence
of contractual agreements that prevent hospitals from charging their standard
rates.27 The five classes are the uninsured, those covered by insurance but
going to a provider that has not contracted with the insurance company, pa-
tients seeking treatment after automobile accidents that are covered by car
insurance Personal Injury Protection requirements, and patients seeking
treatment for work related injuries that are covered by workers' compensa-
tion plans.20 8 Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fee
schedule for cases where patients are being treated for ailments or injuries
covered by workers compensation insurance. 2°9 Just recently, the Florida
Legislature imposed maximum reimbursement rates for most services that
are covered by Personal Injury Protection policies for those that seek medical
treatment related to an automobile accident. 210  For most non-emergency
services, this maximum rate is set to 200% of the Medicare reimbursement
rate.21 In the case of emergency services, the maximum reimbursement rate
for hospitals is set to be "75 percent of the hospital's usual and customary
charges," and for physicians' services provided in a hospital, the maximum
reimbursement is set to be "the usual and customary charges in the commu-
nity., 212 According to the legislative history, this maximum reimbursement
rate was added because determining "the amount of reasonable charges is
dollars. Colomar IV, 2007 WL 2083562 at *6. Finally, she relied on nationwide market data
rather than comparing Mercy's prices to other local hospitals. Id. at *5.
205. See Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l Hosp., No. 8:06-cv-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48867, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2007); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 382 F.
Supp. 2d 562, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Howard v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 924 So. 2d
1245, 1259 (La. 2d Ct. App. 2006).
206. See Maldonado 11, 493 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2007).
207. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 781.
208. Id.
209. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(12) (2008).
210. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(5)(a)2 (2008).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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often litigated in Florida courts between providers and insures which further
increases CoStS. '213 Only time will tell if these provisions will reduce the
amount of litigation between the providers and insurers given the reference
to usual and customary charges in the statute.214
The Florida Legislature has also tried to address the issue of protecting
the uninsured from being overcharged in several ways. In 2007, a bill was
introduced that would have required hospitals to charge any uninsured pa-
tients with a "household income of less than $125,000," a fee no higher than
the highest contracted fee the hospital has agreed to accept for the same ser-
vice from private insurers.215 The bill was never passed, perhaps because of
concerns from lobbyists for health insurance companies that such a bill could
discourage providers from negotiating with health insurance companies-
since lowering rates with the insurance companies would also lower the max-
imum they could charge to some uninsured." 6
Although this bill to set a maximum that health care providers could
charge to some uninsured patients failed, the Senate has passed two new laws
in 2008 which may help in some situations. The Health Care Consumer's
Right to Information Act, among other provisions, requires health care pro-
viders to automatically provide estimates to uninsured patients for any sche-
duled non-emergency medical services and requires the providers to auto-
matically inform the patients of any "discount or charity policies" that might
be available from that provider.217 The act also requires hospitals to disclose
their standard charges for some of the most common services as well as other
pertinent financial information that is to be made publicly available by the
Agency for Health Care Administration.218 While this act may help the unin-
sured shop for reasonable rates and pre-negotiate prices with the service pro-
viders for non-emergency services, the bill will probably do little to help in
dealing with overcharging for emergency services. Actually, the bill could
hurt the patient's chances of proving the charges are unreasonable if they
were readily available before the emergency situation arose.
Even though the Florida Legislature may believe that price transparency
will help the uninsured make more informed decisions, the primary focus of
213. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 13C (2007) Staff Analysis 8 (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007C/House/bills/analysis/pdf/hOO13Cc. JEC.pdf.
214. See FLA. STAT. § 641.513(5)(b) (2008).
215. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Reg., SB 1756 (2007) Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2007s1756
.hr.pdf.
216. Id. at 3.
217. Health Care Consumer's Right to Information Act, ch. 2008-47, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws
739, 740.
218. See id. at 739, 742-43.
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the legislature for resolving this crisis is to reduce the number of uninsured
Floridians.2 9 A new law which passed in May, 2008, creates the Cover Flor-
ida Health Care Access Program °.22  The program creates a special type of
health insurance that does not have to meet the same level of minimum cov-
erage as other health insurance programs. 221 The hope is that private insur-
ance companies will be able to offer affordable health insurance plans, with
premiums of only around $150 a month, with this minimal coverage.2 2 The
plan has been criticized because the law allows for the insurance companies
to cover so little as to make the plans undesirable. 23 Nevertheless, as long as
this minimal coverage at least guarantees contractual discounts similar to
those which other insurance plans provide, the program could help to alle-
viate the issue of determining reasonable charges as there would be fewer
forced to pay without pre-negotiated rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because Florida law requires that determination of a reasonable charge
be based on multiple factors which require individual analysis of each
charge, class certification will probably remain elusive for uninsured patients
that seek declaratory or injunctive relief.224 Nevertheless, all is not lost.
Case law shows that Florida courts will most likely consider the hospital
admission contracts, especially in emergency care situations, to be open
priced contracts and will therefore infer a reasonable price term.225 Although
the cost of litigation may prevent potential plaintiffs from seeking declarato-
ry relief to have the courts clarify how much is actually owed, the patients
can use this as a defense if they are sued by the hospitals or physicians that
provided the emergency services for the charged prices. Courts may even
place a higher burden on hospitals to prove their costs are reasonable when
they are the plaintiffs in the action. Furthermore, the uninsured debtor might
even be able to use unconscionability as a defense in such actions. Finally,
the uninsured patient can file a counterclaim for a violation of the FDUTPA.
Since many of the hospital contracts require the patient to pay legal fees as-
219. See Act effective May 21, 2008, ch. 2008-032, § 3, 2008 Fla. Laws 677, 680 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 408.9091 (2008)).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See Bob LaMendola, Uninsured? Don't Hold Your Breath for Coverage, SUN SENT.,
May 10, 2008, at Al.
223. See id.
224. See Colomar I, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
225. See Payne v. Humana Hosp. Orange Park, 661 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
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sociated with debt collection, the patients have little to lose should they not
prevail on their claim of the FDUTPA violation. On the other hand, if the
court finds that the charged prices are unreasonable, the court is unlikely to
award legal fees to the hospital even if the court does not believe the hospit-
al's actions are an unfair or unconscionable act as defined by the statute. The
fact that the hospital is actually trying to enforce the full debt via the courts,
however, may make the trier of fact more inclined to find that the billing
practices are unfair.
Thus, the best strategy for uninsured patients that believe they have
been charged unreasonable amounts and cannot reach a reasonable settle-
ment with the hospital, is to pay a reasonable amount-perhaps paying what
Medicare would reimburse since this information is readily available-and
forcing the hospital to bring legal action to collect the rest. The patients will
have the right to dispute any reports to collection agencies and the hospital or
collection agencies cannot attach any liens or other means of payment with-
out court orders. Alternatively, the uninsured patient might contact the office
of the state attorney-the enforcing authority under FDUTPA-and persuade
the office to bring a claim on the patient's behalf."6 Under FDUTPA, the
enforcing authority can seek to impose a $10,000 civil penalty for every vi-
olation in addition to the remedies available to individuals.227 Proving that
one has tried to make a reasonable settlement agreement which the hospital
has refused might be persuasive in convincing the state attorney to pursue the
claim.
Thus, although the courts are probably not the appropriate means in
Florida of changing the practice by preventing medical service providers
from overcharging uninsured patients, the courts may offer some protection
to individuals who have already been overcharged.
226. See FLA. STAT. § 501.207(1)(c) (2008).
227. FLA. STAT. § 501.2075 (2008).
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